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On Kant’s COnCept Of the publiC use Of ReasOn: 
a RehabilitatiOn Of ORality




In his 1784 An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Kant defines the public 
use of reason as “that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of 
the world of readers” (WA, AA 08: 37)2. With this definition Kant rejects the spoken word and 
designates the written word as the sole medium of the public use of reason. 
Despite this and additional pieces of textual evidence attesting that Kant disqualifies 
the spoken word as medium of public reasoning, Kant’s concept of the public use of reason is 
commonly employed to descriptively and normatively study subjects like freedom of speech 
and political deliberation precisely from the point of view of oral discourse. 
With this paper I intend (a) to reconstruct the reasons why Kant rejects the spoken 
word as medium of the public use of reason and (b) at the same time justify the application of 
Kant’s concept of public reason to the spoken word. More precisely, my objective is to show 
that there is a letter and a spirit to Kant’s concept of the public use of reason. According to the 
letter, the only medium of the public use of reason is the written word, but according to the 
spirit, the spoken word can under specific conditions qualify as medium of the public use of 
reason just as well. 
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Before developing my arguments, I will provide a brief overview of both the primary 
literature designating the written word as the sole medium of the public use of reason and the 
secondary literature applying Kant’s concept of public reasoning to the spoken word.
1. the medium Of the publiC Of ReasOn: wRitten wORd vs. spOKen wORd
Kant describes the activity of communicating to the public one’s thoughts by employing 
expressions such as ‘speaking to the public’ or ‘delivering a speech to the public’, thereby 
employing a language which suggests a relation between an orator and his or her listeners. Yet, 
this terminology should not detract from the fact that by the terms speaking (reden) and speech 
(Rede) Kant also means the written word. For instance, in the Metaphysical First Principles of 
the Doctrine of Right, Kant defines a book as “a writing […] which represents a discourse [Rede] 
that someone delivers to the public by visible linguistic signs” (RL, AA 06: 289) and then 
reiterates that a “writing is […] a discourse [Rede] to the public” (RL, AA 06: 289-290).
What is more, when Kant employs the terms speaking and speech with regard to the 
public use of reason, these terms are to be read as exclusively indicating the written word 
and explicitly excluding the spoken word. That expressions like ‘speaking to the public’ and 
‘delivering a speech to the public’ indicate the activity of communicating one’s thoughts 
by means of the written word emerges most clearly in Kant’s 1785 journal article On the 
Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books. There Kant equates bringing an author’s 
“speech as such to the public [Publikum]” with letting the author “speak publicly [öffentlich 
reden]” (VUB, AA 08: 81) and specifies that it is in a book that “the author speaks to his readers” 
(VUB, AA 08: 80). Thus, whenever Kant uses the terms speaking and speech in combination 
with the terms public (both as the noun Publikum and the adjective öffentlich) and publicly, i.e. 
with reference to his concept of public use of reason, he is to be interpreted as discussing an act 
of communication which takes place by means of the written word.
Kant spells out the notion that speaking to a public, i.e., making public use of one’s 
reason, means addressing the public exclusively through the written word and not through the 
spoken word when he finally defines the medium of public reasoning as a “mute instrument”:
A book is the instrument for delivering a speech to the public […]. This is what is essential here: that 
what is thereby delivered is […] speech […]. By calling it a mute instrument I distinguish it from 
one that delivers speech by sounds, such as a megaphone or even the mouth of another (VUB, AA 
08:81n)3. 
This definition makes two claims. The first claim is that a book is not just one possible 
instrument for delivering a speech to the public but, as underscored by Kant’s use of the 
determinate article, the instrument, i.e., the only instrument of public reasoning. The second 
claim is, as a corollary, that making public use of one’s reason means addressing the public 
exclusively by means of the written word. And indeed, building upon recent studies on Kant’s 
attitude toward popular philosophy and examining both Kant’s stances on the public use of 
reason and his activity as university lecturer, Sean Franzel maintains that on Kant’s view only 
the written word qualifies as medium of public reasoning: “Kant denies that a scholar speaking 
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to an audience or Publikum of listeners can be seen as engaging the public as a whole” (Franzel 
2013: 3).
Nonetheless, despite Kant’s own discussions and the solidity of studies such as Franzel’s, 
numerous scholars employ Kant’s stances on the public use of reason to reflect upon oral 
speech situations and design oral speech practices. Yet, in so doing they commonly imply but 
not explicitly justify that Kant’s concept of public reasoning can be extended to some forms of 
orality. Prominent examples of this are the established fields of Discourse Ethics and Rawlsian 
Deliberative Democracy as well as recent studies reassessing Kant’s attitude toward rhetoric 
as the discursive relation between and orator and his or her listeners (Stroud 2014; Ercolini 
2016). Peter Niesen presents his thorough study Kants Theorie der Redefreiheit clarifying that 
“the expression ‘speech’ [Rede] here is not limited to oral communication but rather employed 
neutrally with regard to the medium [medienneutral verwendet]” (Niesen 2005: 28)4. This 
methodological choice is very representative of the common tendency to implicitly extend 
Kant’s concept of public reasoning to the spoken word without explicitly justifying this 
extension.
My intention is precisely to explicitly justify the commonly practiced and usually not 
accounted for application of Kant’s concept of the public use of reason to the spoken word. I 
shall do so by showing that Kant’s limitation of the public use of reason to the written word 
hinges upon contingent conditions which are not essentially tethered to Kant’s concept of 
public (both as the noun Publikum and the adjective öffentlich). The second section of my 
paper will be devoted to reconstructing the reasons why Kant designates the written word as 
medium of the public use of reason. Conversely, the reasons why Kant rejects the spoken word 
as medium of the public use of reason will be the subject of the third section. Finally, in the 
fourth and last section, I will account for the possibility to remain within Kant’s normative 
framework and nevertheless extend his concept of public reasoning to the spoken word.
2. the pOtential Of the wRitten wORd
To show why Kant designates the written word as the sole medium of the public use 
of reason, I shall as a first step reconstruct the conditions that must obtain for reasoning to be 
public in the Kantian sense and as a second step show why the spoken word do not meet such 
conditions. 
As seen in the Introduction, Kant defines the public use of reason as that use which 
someone makes “before the entire public of the world of readers” (WA, AA 08: 37). He then 
specifies that reasoning is public insofar as it reaches “the public [Publikum] in the strict sense, 
that is, the world” (WA, AA 08: 38). With these two definitions Kant presents the concept of 
public reasoning as to its medium and scope. By limiting the public to “the world of readers” 
Kant defines the written word as the medium of the public use of reason. By extending the 
public to “the world” he then defines all human beings as the scope of the public use of 
reason. Thus, to make public use of one’s reason means using the written word to reach all 
human beings. Since the public use of reason is limited to the written word and at the same 
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time extended to all human beings, two questions arise. The first question is how it is possible 
to extend the scope of the public use of reason to all human beings while at the same time 
limiting its medium to an instrument, the written word, accessible only to the literates. The 
second question is what requirements reasoning should satisfy in order to reach the world, i.e., 
all human beings. 
In my reconstruction, in order for reasoning to reach “the public in the strict sense, that 
is, the world”, two conditions must be fulfilled, i.e., a technological and an epistemic one. The 
technological condition answers the first question on the limitation of the public use of reason 
to the medium of the written word, and the epistemic condition answers the second question 
on the extension of the scope of the public use of reason to all human beings.
As for the technological condition, when Kant in VUB contrasts a book with “a 
megaphone or even the mouth of another”, he shows to be well aware of the possibility that 
thoughts can be disseminated by media other than the written word. As such he explicitly 
mentions an instrument capable of increasing the volume and hence the reach of the voice (a 
megaphone) and dissemination by word of mouth (the mouth of another). I think that the 
reason why Kant rejects these media and restricts the public use of reason to the medium of the 
written word is that these possible alternatives exhibit decisive deficiencies. However powerful 
a megaphone can be or whatever other tool one can employ to increase the reach of one’s voice, 
the contents thus conveyed cannot materially reach “the world”. In the case of dissemination 
by word of mouth, thoughts are conveyed to an audience not by their author but, with or 
without the author’s authorization, by an intermediary. However accurate or competent the 
intermediary may be, neither the audience nor the author can be sure that the thoughts are 
conveyed precisely in the way that preserves the meaning intended by the author. Whoever is 
even minimally acquainted with Socrates or Christian scholarship knows, on the one side, how 
widely disseminated Socrates’ and Jesus’ thoughts are but, on the other side, how many disputes 
exist on which tenets are to be attributed to Socrates and Jesus, i.e., the thoughts’ authors, or 
to the interpretation of Plato and the evangelists, i.e., their intermediaries. So, the only way 
for the author to retain control over the dissemination of his thoughts, i.e., to make sure that 
they reach the public the way he intends them, is to communicate them directly through the 
written word. In sum, the written word is in Kant’s time the only medium capable of widely 
disseminating one’s thoughts (which a megaphone cannot accomplish) without incurring the 
possibly distorting effects of oral dissemination (which the mouth of another can hardly avoid). 
As for the epistemic condition, what makes reasoning public is its capacity to pass the 
universalizability test that Kant lays out in his 1786 essay What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself 
in Thinking? Strictly speaking, the immediate subject of WDO is not so much public reasoning 
as it is correct thinking, more precisely the right way to think about supersensible objects, i.e., 
objects for which there can be no possible experience. Nevertheless, the essay is essential to any 
comprehensive understanding of Kant’s concept of the public use of reason. In fact, posing the 
rhetorical question: “How much and how correctly would we think if we did not think as it 
were in community with others […]!” (WDO, AA 08: 144), Kant subjects both the quantity 
and quality of thinking to its taking place publicly. Since Kant singles out publicity as the 
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necessary condition for both the activity and correctness of thinking, all he says about thinking 
in WDO can be read as specifying his concept of public reasoning. Kant concludes the essay 
with a footnote whose content is commonly referred to as a universalizability test, and thereby 
establishing the criterion that reasoning must uphold to be suited for public use: 
To make use of one’s own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to 
assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one 
assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason (WDO, AA 08:146n). 
On Katerina Deligiorgi’s interpretation, this passage illustrates the requirements that 
thoughts should satisfy in order to 
address the world at large […] in the form of a universalizability test to which we ought to submit our 
criteria for accepting or rejecting an argument […]. When we examine the merits of an argument, 
Kant maintains, we should at the same time examine what sort of criteria we use in our judgment and 
whether these can be considered as universally valid (Deligiorgi 2005: 65). 
Thus, a thought is suitable for public use, when the criteria of its validity can be 
considered as universally valid. What criteria can be considered as universally valid and, 
consequently, as making the thoughts derived from them suitable for public use is most clearly 
defined by Onora O’Neill. According to O’Neill, by means of the universalizability test Kant is 
establishing reason as the ultimate authority of thinking and stating that only a communication 
that does not presuppose any authority other than reason qualifies as public: 
A communication that presupposes some authority other than that of reason may fail to communicate 
with those who are not subject to that authority […]. But a communication that does not presuppose 
such an authority […] is in principle accessible to the world at large […] (O’Neill 1989: 34).
Thus, the grounds on which one assumes something cannot be made “into a universal 
principle for the use of reason”, when they are not universally shareable from individual to 
individual and from group to group, i.e., when they consist in something other than reason5. 
As for individuals, such grounds are both personal preferences, namely everything that, either 
in the moral or in the aesthetic field, refers to inclinations, and Schwärmerei, namely the 
delusion of having sensible experience of objects for which no such experience is possible. As 
for groups, non-shareable grounds are either religious teachings assumed only for the authority 
or traditional value attached to them or political principles assumed only by virtue of their 
pragmatic value6. 
From both Kant’s definitions and his interpreters’ readings, it emerges that Publikum 
and öffentlich are not descriptive but rather normative concepts. They do not describe the mere 
act of communicating one’s thoughts to a multitude of persons but establish the requirements 
that thoughts must satisfy to be public, i.e., universally valid and thereby capable of reaching 
the public, i.e., all human beings7. Before all actual communication, thoughts qualify as public 
insofar as their grounds are universally valid, namely shareable by all human beings committed 
to judging contents setting aside their personal preferences and the framework of their particular 
religious and political affiliation. In other words, to make public use of one’s reason does not 
mean, descriptively, the act of expressing one’s thoughts to however many persons. To make 
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public use of one’s reason rather means, normatively, successfully performing the epistemic 
task of deriving one’s thoughts from grounds which can be potentially shared by all human 
beings. The potentiality involved in Kant’s concept of public reasoning (the accessibility in 
principle stressed by O’Neill) speaks to the two additional requirements that the thoughts in 
question be actually disseminated and that their recipients assess them according to the same 
criteria of universalizability upon which the thoughts have been made by their author suitable 
for public use. Thus, the adjective public (öffentlich) conveys the normative requirement that 
thoughts must meet in order to be shareable by potentially all human beings, and the noun 
public (Publikum) encompasses all human beings insofar as they are able to communicate with 
one another because both the thoughts that they communicate and their assessment of the 
thoughts communicated to them comply with such normative requirement.
Putting together the discussions of the technological and epistemic conditions attached to 
Kant’s concept of public (both as the noun Publikum and the adjective öffentlich), the following 
upshot can be drawn: in order to make public use of one’s reason, one has (1) to prepare one’s 
thoughts so as to render them shareable by all human beings and (2) to communicate them 
through a medium which both disseminates them as widely as possible and reproduce them 
so as their author intends them. In other words, reasoning is public if it satisfies the epistemic 
condition of universalizability and the technological condition of appropriate dissemination.
3. the shORtCOmings Of the spOKen wORd
After reconstructing the conditions that reasoning must meet in order to be public 
and showing why Kant designates the written word as medium of the public use of reason, 
I shall now reconstruct the reasons why the spoken word, on Kant’s view, does not meet the 
conditions required to reach “the public in the strict sense, that is, the world”.
The orators referred to by Kant, namely the persons who orally address listeners, are the 
clergyman and the university teacher, and both are limited by two conditions, a technological 
and a juridical one. 
The technological condition is the one illustrated in the previous section: in Kant’s 
time the only available technology widely to communicate contents without relying on 
dissemination by word of mouth and incurring its possibly distorting effects is the written 
word. As a consequence, the technological condition of the orator precludes him materially 
from communicating his thoughts to “the world” and from communicating them exactly the 
way he conceives them.
The juridical condition consists in the orator’s being a state employee under an absolute 
ruler, and hence in his contractual obligation only to communicate the contents prescribed 
by his employment contract with the state. Kant famously qualifies the use that a state official 
makes of his reason in his capacity as a state employee as private: “What I call the private use 
of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office [in einem bürgerlichen 
Posten oder Amte] with which he is entrusted” (WA, AA 08: 37). The orator, insofar as he is 
considered in his role as a state official, is forbidden from expressing his own thoughts “since 
he is carrying out another’s commission” (WA, AA 08: 38), i.e., since he is bound only to 
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communicate the teachings that are set out in his employment contract with the state and 
constitute his terms of engagement. Accordingly, when he addresses his listeners, Kant’s orator 
does not speak in his own person but in the state’s person. As a consequence, he is obliged 
“to deliver [what he teaches] as prescribed and in the name of another [nach Vorschrift und im 
Namen eines andern]” (WA, AA 08: 38), namely the state, “for he was employed by it on that 
condition” (WA, AA 08: 38). On Kant’s view, the contents conveyed by the orator do not 
meet the normative requirements expressed by the noun Publikum and the adjective öffentlich, 
because they are not universalizable. They are not universalizable because they are not derived 
from the ultimate authority of reason. Rather, they are meant to serve the particular interests 
of the absolute ruler with regard to the particular community of his subjects. According to 
O’Neill, such contents only address
bounded pluralities, defined by civic or social institutions, practices, and ideologies, whereas for Kant 
public reason requires thinking and acting that address an unrestricted plurality, the world at large 
(O’Neill 2001: 45).
Echoing O’Neill’s reading, Fleischacker maintains that
“private” derives from a Latin word meaning “set apart,” “lacking,” or “deprived” […]. Kant takes the 
term […] to describe individuals insofar as they are “deprived of” their common humanity – insofar 
as they are limited to some specific aspect of themselves, which links them to just one community 
among others, rather than to humanity at large (Fleischacker 2013: 16).
Consequently, the juridical condition of the orator violates the epistemic condition 
expressed by the concepts Publikum and öffentlich. 
Thus, on my reconstruction, Kant rejects the spoken word as medium for the public use 
of reason because the orator he considers acts under a technological and a juridical condition 
which prevent him or her from satisfying the technological and the epistemic condition 
required by the concept of public, both as a noun and as an adjective. 
4. a RehabilitatiOn Of the spOKen wORd
Although it is impossible for Kant’s orator to make public use of his or her reason because 
of the technological and juridical conditions under which he or she acts, it is nevertheless 
possible to place the orator under conditions that allow for a public use of reason in the strong 
normative Kantian sense.
As for the technological condition, in the second section of this paper, I termed 
appropriate dissemination the condition that allows thoughts to be communicated so as to reach 
“the public in the strict sense, that is, the world”. On my reconstruction of the technological 
condition of Kant’s notion of public use of reason, the dissemination of thoughts takes place 
in an appropriate manner if the thoughts in question meet two requirements: they must be 
able to materially reach the world (at least potentially) and be conveyed precisely how the 
author conceives them. I shall term the former the requirement of wide dissemination and the 
latter the requirement of faithful dissemination. Present-day mass and personal media satisfy 
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both requirements: allowing the even worldwide dissemination of contents, they satisfy the 
requirement of wide dissemination, and allowing the reproduction of contents, they satisfy 
the requirement of faithful dissemination. For example, if disseminated through audio and/or 
mass or personal media, even a speech held in one’s room before one’s laptop is capable of being 
widely and faithfully disseminated. As a consequence, under possible technological conditions 
different from those existing in Kant’s time, the spoken word can be as suitable as the written 
word as medium of the public use of reason. The normative requirements of wide and faithful 
dissemination remain in place, but communication technologies not available in Kant’s time 
allow the extension of this aspect of his concept of public reasoning to the spoken word. 
As for the juridical condition, as seen in the previous section, the orator considered by 
Kant is a state official contractually obliged only to disseminate the contents prescribed by the 
state. Since such contents do not rest on the authority of reason but serve the particular interest 
of a ruler with regard to the particular community of his subjects, they are not universalizable. 
Since they are not universalizable, they do not qualify as public use of reason. Accordingly, 
since Kant equates the orator with a state employee entrusted with the dissemination of 
non-universalizable contents, the spoken word does not meet the epistemic condition 
of universalizability required by Kant’s concept of public reasoning. Nonetheless, if a state 
official acts under a juridical condition which does not bind him only to convey the contents 
prescribed by the state, the state official, and with him or her the orator, can also be considered 
as being able of making public use of his or her reason. For example, in a legal system which 
guarantees university teachers freedom of teaching, the teacher namely, remaining within the 
framework of Kant’s examples, the orator is allowed to make public use of his or her reason, i.e., 
to communicate thoughts which stand the universalizability test. Accordingly, under possible 
juridical conditions different from those obtaining in Kant’s Prussia, the spoken word can 
qualify as medium of the public use of reason just as well as the written word. The epistemic 
condition of universalizability remains in place, but the framework of a different legal system 
allows the extension of this aspect of Kant’s concept of public use of reason to the spoken word. 
It emerges from this discussion that Kant’s concept of what constitutes a public use 
of reason entails both a normative and a contingent aspect. On the normative side, Kant’s 
concept of public (both as the noun Publikum and the adjective öffentlich) places on the 
subjects the conditions that their reasoning be universalizable and appropriately disseminated. 
On the contingent side, only the written word qualifies as medium of public reasoning, i.e., 
as reasoning that can be universalized and appropriately disseminated. This aspect of Kant’s 
concept of public use of reason is contingent, because it hinges upon technological and juridical 
conditions which can be modified without compromising the fulfillment of the requirements 
that reasoning be widely disseminated and universalizable. 
Thus, according to the letter of Kant’s discussions of the public use of reason, a specific 
set of media (the media of orality) and a specific set of subjects (the orators) are not suitable for 
public reasoning. Nevertheless, since the technological and juridical conditions which produce 
this exclusion can be modified without detriment to the normative core of Kant’s concept of 
public use of reason, it is possible to rehabilitate orality as medium of public reasoning: under 
technological conditions which satisfy the requirements of appropriate dissemination and 
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juridical conditions which do not compromise the epistemic condition of universalizability, 
the orator can make public use of his or her reason as well as the writer and the spoken word 
can serve as medium of public reasoning as well as the written word. 
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depend either on unshareable personal experience or on authoritative texts” (Fleischacker 2013: 24).
6 Cf. KrV: “Now there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this 
searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons” (KrV, A 738/B766).
7 Günter Zöller explicitly highlights the normative character of the adjective ‘public’ when, commenting on the 
universalizability test, he stresses that the task of performing the test amounts to a “commitment to the possible universality 
of epistemic reasons and rules” of thinking (2009: 90. My translation and emphasis). 
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